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Figure 1. Energy and Commodity Prices
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.




Shocks and the Economic Outlook
Kenneth R. Beauchemin
The U.S. economy has recently been hit by a number of supply shocks, and businesses and consumers have seen oil, 
food, and materials prices rise as a result. Such shocks typically take several years to play themselves out completely. 
I apply a downsized version of a macroeconomic forecasting model in use at the Cleveland Fed to project the likely 
quantitative impact of the shocks on GDP growth and consumer prices.
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During the opening months of 2011, the U.S. economy was 
beset by a number of shocks. In January and early February, 
unusually strong and widespread winter storms pummelled 
the country. These brought construction projects to a halt, 
left necessary parts and materials stranded in warehouses, 
and disrupted factory production schedules. Further dis-
ruptions followed in the wake of the March 11 Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami, as U.S industries reliant on compo-
nents imported from Japan, including automotive parts and 
semiconductors, had to scale back production.
But perhaps the most signiﬁ  cant shock has been the political 
uprisings in the Middle Eastern and North African coun-
tries. These tumultuous events drove the price of oil roughly 
$15 to $20 per barrel higher—a movement that reﬂ  ects not 
so much current supply disruptions, but more so the height-
ened risk to future oil supplies. Sudden spikes in the price 
of oil occupy a special place in macroeconomic analysis, as 
really large ones are often followed by slowdowns in eco-
nomic activity and even recessions. But the run-up in energy 
prices—along with other industrial commodity prices—has 
also led to widespread concerns about inﬂ  ation (ﬁ  gure 1).
Economists refer to such events as “supply shocks” in that 
they disrupt production activities in one way or another. 
What are the economic consequences of these shocks, and 
how might they inﬂ  uence the outlook for U.S. economic 
growth and consumer price inﬂ  ation? Macroeconomic the-
ory produces clear qualitative descriptions of an economy’s 
response to supply shocks, but it is less apt at quantifying 
these effects. In this Commentary, I brieﬂ  y outline the econom-
ic principles that underlie the effects of supply shocks, and 
then apply a smaller version of a forecasting model in use 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland to help quantify 
those effects in the current environment.
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To discuss economic dynamics, economists often frame the 
passage of time in terms of the short, intermediate, and long 
run. In what follows, the short run is to be understood as 
one or two quarters after the onset of a temporary shock. It 
can be thought of as the length of time over which the “im-
pact effect” of the shock is sustained. The intermediate run 
is the length of time it takes for the shock to play itself out 
in the economy—typically a period of between two and ﬁ  ve 
years. Beyond the intermediate run, the long run describes 
the economy after the shock’s effects have been completely 
played out.
In the long run, the rate at which an economy grows is 
mainly determined by three factors: the growth rate of the 
labor force, the rate at which capital equipment and struc-
tures are accumulated, and productivity growth. Note that 
these forces are “real” and not monetary in nature. Long-
run inﬂ  ation, on the other hand, is dominated by monetary 
considerations and is therefore under the control of the 
central bank. But in the short and medium run, real and 
monetary forces jointly inﬂ  uence both growth and inﬂ  ation.
The course of economic growth and the path of inﬂ  ation 
depend to a large extent on the production and pricing be-
haviors of ﬁ  rms. As a consequence, the modern workhorse 
theoretical macroeconomic models pay particular attention 
to incorporating these behaviors.
Like actual businesses, the ﬁ  rms in these models possess 
some degree of market power or the ability to set a price in 
excess of production costs. Speciﬁ  cally, the prices they set 
reﬂ  ect their marginal cost of production—the real cost of 
producing an additional unit of output—and a markup over 
this cost.
Production costs naturally arise from a ﬁ  rm’s purchases of 
production inputs, including labor services and materials. 
Consider the example of labor—fundamental to the produc-
tion of virtually everything. Firms hire workers at market 
compensation levels. If software engineers are highly sought 
after and there are not many to be found, then real compen-
sation for these workers will be considerable. The per unit 
labor cost of a ﬁ  rm naturally depends on the productivity of 
its employees, too. Relatively productive employees produce 
more output in a given hour, which spreads out their hourly 
compensation over more units of output and keeps the real 
marginal cost of production low.
Although labor is a critically important input, it is not the 
only one. Production costs also reﬂ  ect the cost of materi-
als and the ability with which a ﬁ  rm can substitute among 
materials and between labor and materials more generally. 
Final goods prices will rise or fall then, when either real unit 
labor costs or energy and materials prices rise or fall. If we 
wish to predict real economic activity and inﬂ  ation, we need 
a model that includes roles for labor productivity, compen-
sation, commodity prices, and monetary policy, and it needs 
to be able to disentangle their intertwined roles in output 
and inﬂ  ation dynamics.
In principle, a supply shock affects output and prices in the 
following way. Consider a sudden and unexpected jump in 
oil prices not unlike the one caused by the Middle Eastern 
and African political turmoil. Distilled into the primary 
transportation fossil fuels (such as gasoline, diesel oil, jet 
fuel) the initial increase in oil prices raises production costs 
to all who must move goods. The production of various 
plastics, a ubiquitous intermediate material, depends heavily 
on crude oil and natural gas. Other industrial chemical in-
puts derive from crude oil. Clearly, production costs across 
wide swaths of the economy move higher.
At the ﬁ  rm level, a sudden and unexpected rise in the price 
of a key material input (such as crude oil) makes it unproﬁ  t-
able to expand output. The rise in marginal cost signals the 
ﬁ  rm to reduce output and to raise its price. For a variety 
of reasons though, it is impractical or unwise for ﬁ  rms to 
continually reset prices in the face of changing cost condi-
tions. Instead, they will sometimes allow their markup to 
ﬂ  uctuate to absorb a change in costs. Although not all ﬁ  rms 
will respond with output reductions and higher prices, some 
will. So, in the aggregate, we expect to observe slower GDP 
growth and increases in ﬁ  nal goods prices.
A temporary supply shock, though, cannot be the proximate 
cause of inﬂ  ation, which by deﬁ  nition is a sustained increase 
in the rate of growth of the price level. If however, the 
temporary increase in ﬁ  nal goods prices is misperceived to 
be longer lasting, inﬂ  ation expectations will move higher—an 
event that can indeed generate an inﬂ  ationary episode. In 
the long run, inappropriately accommodative monetary 
policy causes inﬂ  ation to run above a suitable target rate.
A BVAR Forecasting Model
Macroeconomic forecasters have in their toolkit a power-
ful class of models called Bayesian vector-autoregressive, 
or BVAR (pronounced BEE-vahr), models that capture the 
complex and dynamic nature of actual economies. They 
are ﬂ  exible and can be expanded to include a number of 
variables that are relevant to both real activity and inﬂ  ation. 
For the present inquiry, that means labor productivity and 
compensation, commodity prices, and some other relevant 
variables.
The “Bayesian” part of BVAR means that “extra-sample” 
beliefs held by the forecaster may be introduced into the 
forecast along with the degree of conﬁ  dence that he or she 
attaches to these beliefs. For BVARs, these so-called “priors” 
typically represent commonly held views about the long-
term properties of macroeconomic time series. In essence, 
the additional information allows the statistical procedures 
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ly—to make the best use of a limited amount of data. The 
“vector” part of the name simply means that the models 
forecast a number of economic concepts at once, not just 
one. Finally, the “autoregressive” part implies that a fore-
cast of any one variable depends on the past history of all 
model variables—including its own.
At the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, we use a small-
scale BVAR to help produce our ofﬁ  cial forecast, which 
along with those of every other Federal Reserve bank pres-
ident and member of the Board of Governors, is submitted 
to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) four 
times per year. For the experiment that follows, we will use 
a similar, but smaller 10-variable BVAR model containing 
the following concepts: real GDP, the core and headline 
PCE price indexes, total payroll employment, nonfarm 
business compensation, nonfarm business productivity, the 
West Texas intermediate crude oil price (WTI), the Com-
modity Research Bureau (CRB) index of raw industrial 
commodity prices (non-energy and non-food), the CRB 
price index for foodstuffs, and the federal funds rate.
A few notes of explanation are in order. Real GDP, as the 
broadest measure of U.S. output, is of fundamental interest 
as a broad gauge of living standards. Together, labor com-
pensation and labor productivity imply the per unit labor 
cost of production (compensation divided by productivity 
equals unit labor costs), which, when coupled with the 
core PCE index implies a measure of the real marginal cost 
of labor. Note that the selection of variables also implies 
a measure of hours worked through the joint consider-
ation of real GDP (output) and labor productivity (output 
divided by hours). Neverthess, I explicitly include payroll 
employment for a headcount measure of the labor input. 
The CRB index of commodity prices measures nominal 
commodity prices, but the presence of the core PCE index 
in the model implies that we are getting a measure of real 
commodity prices. Finally, the federal funds rate is the 
primary operating instrument of monetary policy and 
therefore gauges the stance of monetary policy.
The Effects of Unexpectedly High Commodity Prices
To quantify the impacts of the ﬁ  rst-quarter shocks, I use 
the BVAR model to conduct a conditional forecasting ex-
periment. The experiment compares two model-generated 
forecasts. The ﬁ  rst, or baseline forecast, uses quarterly 
historical data from the 1959-2010 period to estimate the 
model parameters. The estimated model is then used 
to produce a forecast spanning the period from the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter of 2013. Note that 
even though ﬁ  rst-quarter 2011 data are available, they are 
ignored when estimating the parameters and generating 
the forecast. The baseline scenario describes the expected 
path of the economy from the perspective of an observer 
at the beginning of the year, before the shocks of the ﬁ  rst 
quarter came to pass.
The second forecast is the alternative forecast, and it uses 
the same estimated model as the baseline to generate a 
forecast over the same 2011-13 period, but it includes (or is 
“conditional on”) the commodity price levels observed in 
the ﬁ  rst quarter—everything else is the same. (The commod-
ity prices are given by the WTI oil price, the raw industrial 
materials commodity price index, and the foodstuffs price 
index.) The comparison indicates how the forecast would 
have differed had one possessed the knowledge of ﬁ  rst-quar-
ter commodity prices at the end of 2010. If one is prepared 
to assume that the difference between the actual ﬁ  rst-quarter 
commodity prices and those that would have been expected 
at the end of 2010 (i.e., the baseline levels) were due en-
tirely to the unanticipated supply shocks, then the different 
outlooks reﬂ  ect the continuing impacts of those shocks. The 
ancillary assumption seems reasonable, for it is unlikely that 
global demand conditions suddenly and swiftly changed 
during the ﬁ  rst quarter.
Although commodity prices were already on the rise in the 
fourth quarter of 2010, the baseline simulation indicates 
that the increase was expected to slow in the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2011. For example, after averaging $85 per barrel in the 
fourth quarter, the price of WTI crude oil was expected to 
average $90 per barrel in the ﬁ  rst quarter, according to the 
baseline simulation. The ﬁ  rst-quarter average price came in 
$13 higher at $103 per barrel (roughly 15 percent). Interest-
ingly, the BVAR model turned out to be an excellent predic-
tor of the futures prices for WTI crude during this time. 
The two-month contract in mid-to-late December averaged 
roughly $90—nearly identical to the expectation generated 
by the BVAR baseline forecast.
Figure 2 compares the baseline (unconditioned) and alterna-
tive (conditional) forecasts of commodity prices, expressed 
in annual rates of change. Baseline ﬁ  rst-quarter expecta-
tions undershot for all three commodity-price concepts in 
the model—quite drastically on all counts. Beyond the ﬁ  rst 
quarter, the gaps between commodity-price growth rates in 
the conditional and baseline forecasts rapidly evaporate and 
return to trend growth paths. But ﬁ  gure 3, which plots the 
level of commodity prices instead of their rates of growth, 
makes it clear that there is no “correction” for the ﬁ  rst-quar-
ter shocks, meaning that commodity prices are permanently 
higher in the conditional forecast. A return to baseline 
commodity-price levels would require periods of falling 
commodity prices in the wake of the ﬁ  rst-quarter shocks.
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Commodity Prices (annual rates of change)
Figure 3. Baseline and Conditional Forecasts of 
Commodity Prices (price levels)
Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Shaded bar indicates a recession.
Source: Author’s calculations.
But what are the consequences of these price effects for 
real activity and inﬂ  ation? Figures 4 and 5 indicate that all 
goes according to the principles: Beginning in the second 
quarter, real GDP growth falls and inﬂ  ation rises, but by 
fairly modest amounts in both cases. Figure 4 shows that 
the maximum reduction in real GDP growth (annual rates) 
is just 0.4 percentage point, occurring in the fourth quarter 
of 2011; the gap between the two forecasts steadily closes 
thereafter. As for inﬂ  ation, ﬁ  gure 5 shows that PCE inﬂ  ation 
(annual rate) jumps 0.7 percentage point (from 1.5 percent 
to 2.2 percent) in the second quarter of 2011 and shows 
more persistence than real GDP, as it returns only gradually 
to the baseline forecast.
The sharp response of PCE inﬂ  ation is due to the rapid 
pass-through of energy and food commodity prices into 
consumer energy and food prices. Most auspiciously, the 
price of gasoline to the consumer responds quickly to 
changes in crude oil prices. Indeed, core PCE inﬂ  ation, or 
inﬂ  ation excluding food and energy prices, rises a more 
muted 0.3 percentage point by the fourth quarter of 2011 
(from 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent), reﬂ  ecting the limitations 
confronted by ﬁ  rms in passing on higher commodity costs 
to consumers.
The Bottom Line
In summary, the analysis indicates that the shocks we 
experienced in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2011 have had measur-
able effects on both economic activity and consumer price 
inﬂ  ation. However, as long as energy and other commodity 
prices do not continue to rise sharply, these effects are likely 
to be temporary and modest.
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